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Abstract 
 
This project involves a review of the Transaction Cost Theory and its ability to 
effectively explain the organization of economic activity. Based on the works of Ronald 
Coase and, in particular, the works of Oliver Williamson, the foundations of this theory 
and its predictions about the governance structure of economic transactions are 
studied. Following this review, the cases of two companies are analyzed in order to 
evaluate the theory´s ability to explain the decision of internalizing specific activities. 
The outcome of the theory´s empirical application showcased its ability to effectively 
explicate the internalization of activities whose transaction costs are lower within the 
boundaries of the firm, while highlighting its limitations in situations where the decision 
to internalize activities is mainly motivated by strategic factors or limited by financial 
factors. 
 
Word Count: 11,850  
Keywords: outsourcing, vertical integration, emprical application, asset specificity 
 
 
Resumen!
 
Este trabajo consiste en una revisión de la Teoría de Costes de Transacción y su 
capacidad para explicar la organización de las actividades económicas. A partir de los 
trabajos de Ronald Coase y, fundamentalmente, de Oliver Williamson se describen los 
fundamentos básicos de esta teoría y sus predicciones sobre la estructura de gobierno 
de las transacciones económicas. Posteriormente, se analizan los casos de dos 
empresas con el fin de comprobar la capacidad de esta teoría, así como sus 
limitaciones para explicar la decisión de integrar ciertas actividades dentro de los 
límites de la empresa. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto su capacidad para explicar 
la integración de actividades desde un punto de vista económico. Sin embargo cuando 
en las decisiones de integración existen motivos de naturaleza estratégica o 
financiera, la teoría exhibe su limitación.  
 
Número de Palabras: 11,850 
Palabras clave: subcontratación, integración vertical, aplicación empírica, activos específicos 
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Introduction 
The development of the Transaction Cost Theory has greatly influenced the 
understanding of the organization of economic activity – the classic dichotomy 
between markets and hierarchy as forms of organization – and, as a result, has 
also impacted the understanding of economic systems´ behavior. Markets are 
not always the most effective mechanism of coordinating exchanges when 
there are certain costs that generate frictions in the implementation of the price 
mechanism. These costs are known as transaction costs and are the very core 
of this theory.  
As transaction costs rise, and consequently the cost of using the price 
mechanism increases, transactions will tend to be coordinated through other 
more efficient organization alternatives – alternatives that reduce transaction 
costs. The main alternative to the price mechanism is coordinating the 
exchange within the firm; this implies that the activity is integrated within the 
boundaries of the firm. As stated by Williamson, “the study of transaction cost 
economizing is thus a comparative institutional undertaking which recognizes 
that there are a variety of distinguishably different transactions on the one hand 
and a variety of alternative governance structures on the other” (1981b, p. 
1544). With these concepts in mind, the Transaction Cost Theory´s main 
objective is to construct an analytical guideline that sanctions the assessment of 
which factors determine the magnitude and volume of transaction costs and 
their influence on the decision to use one organization mechanism over its 
alternatives. The Transaction Cost Theory becomes, therefore, an extension of 
the theory of the firm and indicates that firms exist because they are a more 
efficient organizational alternative to manage certain transactions. This greater 
efficiency is consistent of a well-working interface that minimizes almost 
completely any frictions. 
The decision to focus the dissertation on this area of study was made 
taking into account that many firms reconfigure their portfolio of activities in 
order to be more efficient by either integrating new activities or contracting other 
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 activities through the market and that the Transaction Cost Theory explains 
these organizational phenomena to a certain degree. Consequently, this 
dissertation is composed of two levels of study - theoretical and empirical.  
The theoretical part consists of an in depth review of the Transaction Cost 
Theory: its origins, its foundations, applications and main limitations. From a 
methodological perspective, the theoretical analysis is primarily based on the 
works of Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson.  
The empirical approach consists in studying the cases of two companies 
who have decided to internalize certain activities within their boundaries. The 
methodology of field research was applied to the practical section of this paper. 
The first case study consisted of a glassworks firm located in Coruña that has 
integrated an activity previously coordinated through the market. An interview 
with the owner was conducted in order to gain insight as to the nature of firm, its 
activities as well as the factors that influenced the decision to integrate the 
subcontracted activity. This information facilitates the application of the 
Transaction Cost Theory conducive towards the analysis and comprehension of 
why one organizational alternative was preferable to another. The second case 
study selected was a U.K.-based start-up company whose main activity 
consists of renting luxury vacation homes in London and New York City. The 
new alternative to vacation lodging is a rising trend in the hospitality industry 
and, given its possible effect on the future of tourism, piqued a certain level of 
interest as to its method of organization. Due to its novelty, the company is 
reluctant to share major details as to its internal organization, decision-making 
criteria and certain operational details since it presents major differences with 
comparable competitors in the market, thus all information about this company 
hails from the information published on their corporate website and publications 
regarding the company. In spite of this, there is enough information to analyze 
the decision of internalizing the activity of home services. Unlike the first case, 
this activity was not originally coordinated through the market. 
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 1. Transaction Cost Economics: 
Theoretical Foundations 
 
1.1 The Transaction Cost Approach and Its Antecedents  
 
Classic economic theory proposes that the firm´s main function is to 
produce a good with the objective to maximize profits. This proposition is 
viewed to be lacking in the ability to explain the organizational phenomena of 
the existence of firms and why certain activities are integrated within their 
boundaries. There have been many other approaches to the study of 
organizations proposed, such as managerial discretion theory, agency theory 
and the transaction cost approach. This paper will focus on the transaction cost 
approach and the works of its main contributors: Ronald Coase and Oliver E. 
Williamson. 
“The transaction cost approach to the study of economic organization 
regards the transaction1 as the basic unit of analysis and holds that an 
understanding of transaction cost economizing is central to the study of 
organizations” (Williamson, 1981a, p. 548). Although this approach is not able 
to address all organizational issues, it is capable of explaining many situations 
by using the transaction costs as the main unit of analysis as well as evaluating 
the governance structures and their ability to minimize transaction costs.  
The transaction cost approach is applied at three levels of analysis: the firm 
and its organizational design; the operating units, the activities performed within 
the firm, the activities performed outside the firms and the reasoning behind 
these decisions; and the organization of the human assets (Williamson, 1981a, 
p. 549).  In as much, this approach is strongly correlated to economic literature, 
organizational theory literature and contract law literature due to its connection 
with governance matters.  
Despite basing the foundations of the transaction cost approach and 
transaction cost economics on the findings of Coase, it should be noted that the 
antecedents are not limited to his works. Although Coase will be studied in the 
                                                
1 According to Williamson, a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface (1981a, p. 552). 
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 upcoming section, some contributors to the advancement of the transaction 
cost approach should be mentioned.  
Among the first advocates of using transactions as the units of analysis is 
John R. Commons in 1934. He acknowledged the variety of governance 
structures to organize exchanges and viewed that the choice in governance 
structure according to the ability to harmonize said exchanges was a focal point 
in the study of institutional economics.  Another individual who provided further 
support to the transaction cost approach, albeit indirectly, is Friedrich Hayek, 
who highlighted the importance of efficient adaptation in high performance 
economy in his article “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945). Decades 
later, Herbert Simon contributed to the theory recognizing the limits of human 
actors, which are central behavioral assumptions behind Williamson´s 
development of the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT). 
A deepening awareness of transaction cost issues formed over decades 
and the importance of transaction cost economizing grew. The following 
subsections will review the contributions of Coase and Williamson. 
 
1.2 Coase and the Theory of the Firm 
 
Ronald Coase´s “The Nature of the Firm” elaborates the discovery and 
clarification of the significance of transaction costs, as well as other variables, 
for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy. These 
observations are considered to have established the field of transaction cost 
economics. In the previously cited essay, Coase suggests examining 
foundations upon which a theory is built, prior to developing a theory, in order to 
avoid assumptions, which may cause misunderstanding or controversy (1937, 
p.18).  On this note, it seems prudent to commence the study of transaction 
cost economics with the very article upon which the field was founded. 
In his essay, Coase attempts to understand why firms emerge in addition to 
the evolution of their size. Ronald Coase´s approach stems from the following 
contemplation: If the market is as effective in the coordination of economic 
exchanges as neo-classical theory makes it out to be, why aren´t all 
transactions managed through the market?  In other words, why are certain 
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 exchanges carried out within the boundaries of the firm whereas others are not?        
Based on these ideas, Coase points out that there are two alternative 
methods of coordinating production: price mechanisms and the entrepreneur or 
coordinator (1937, p. 19). If production is truly regulated by the price 
mechanism, the question as to why there is any organization at all emerges.   
As an answer to the previous question, Coase offers the following reasons: 
individuals prefer a work relationship instead of being dependent on the price 
mechanism, commodities produced by firms are favored by purchasers, and the 
cost of using the price mechanism is superior to the cost of organizing the 
activity through the firm (1937, p. 20-21).  
Despite having mentioned the previous reasons, Coase negates the 
importance of the first two. The desire of a relationship over price mechanism 
implies that an individual “A” wants to work under the direction of “B”; this goes 
against the more common human desire of wanting to be one´s own master. In 
any case, the desire of the relationship should be viewed from the angle of “B” 
wanting to exercise control over his subordinate “A”. This would mean that “B” 
pays his subordinate more than the price mechanism so he can control him.  
This line of reasoning, however, implies that “B” is not getting paid which is 
untrue and illogical in reality. In reference to the second reason cited, the 
purchasers´ preference of commodities produced by firms, Coase comments 
that even if such a preference existed its importance would be negligible in the 
real world.  
The cost of using the price mechanism seems to be the driving force 
behind the emergence of the firm. The cost of “organizing” production through 
the price mechanism consists of the process of discovering what the relevant 
market prices are. This cost is reduced but not eliminated when specialists sell 
this information. It must be noted that the costs of negotiating and concluding 
separate contracts for each transaction carried out on the market are greatly 
reduced when there is a firm. This is due to the fact that when there is a firm, 
the series of contracts needed to organize transactions through the market is 
substituted by only one contract.  
At this point it seems convenient to properly define the term contract. 
Coase outlines the term as an agreement “whereby the factor, for a certain 
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 remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions 
of an entrepreneur within certain limits” (1937, p. 21). Furthermore, Coase 
highlights that the essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to 
the powers of the entrepreneur so that he can direct other factors of production 
within stated limits. 
In regards to the contract, one must take into account that it may be desired 
to make a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service in order to 
avoid the cost of making or renewing several shorter term contracts. The 
decision to make a long-term contract in lieu of a short-term contract is 
influenced by the risk attitude of the agents involved as well as the uncertainty 
involved in foreseeing the future, which makes it very difficult to conjure a 
detailed contract as to the expectations of the other contracting party. The 
necessity to exact the details of the relationship at a later date causes a 
relationship to develop, which Coase terms a “firm” (1937, p. 21). In other 
words, a firm is likely to emerge in cases where a long-term contract would be 
satisfactory. 
The cost of using the price mechanism is clearly supported by Coase as 
the reason as the main reason of why firms exist. Previously, the cost of using 
the price mechanism was limited to the cost of discovering the relevant prices. 
This must be expanded to include other less obvious factors, such as the 
pressure on the entrepreneur to keep costs below market prices, uncertainty 
and differential treatment of operations (1937, p. 22). These additional factors, 
however, would merely bring about the existence of firms if they did not exist 
already due to other motives.  
The first of these factors is an expansion of the idea that carrying out a 
transaction within a firm is done so because of reduced costs. The entrepreneur 
who coordinates that transaction must keep in mind that if he fails to obtain 
factors of production at a lower price than in the market, it is always possible to 
revert to the open market. Under the pressure of losing the transaction, the 
entrepreneur is careful to fulfill the expectations upon him. 
Second of all, uncertainty is considered to be a relevant variable in the 
study of equilibrium of the firm. Without uncertainty there is a high improbability 
that firms would emerge since the knowledge of the market is absolute. 
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 The topic of differential treatment previously mentioned refers to the 
manner in which governments or other institutions consider transactions 
organized in the market and those same transactions organized through the 
firm. An example of this factor would be operations sales tax. This tax is applied 
to transactions carried out through the price mechanism, but operations 
organized through the firm are not subject to this tax. In this case, transactions 
coordinated by an entrepreneur receive preferential treatment thus eliciting the 
presence of firms, which would not exist in other scenarios.  
With all of these notions in mind, it can be said that the firm consists of the 
system of relationships that derives from the management of resources´ 
dependence on an entrepreneur. Logically, the size of the firm varies in 
accordance with the number of transactions coordinated by the entrepreneur.  
According to Coase (1937, p. 24), the firm tends to be larger, assuming that all 
else remains static, in the following cases:  
 
• When the costs of organizing are low and when said costs rise slower 
than the increase in the transactions organized  
• When it is unlikely that the entrepreneur misallocates the resources or 
when the increase in mistakes is lower than the increase in the 
transactions organized 
• The larger the reduction in the supply price of factors of production to 
larger firms.  
 
When discussing the size of the firm it is critical to take into account the 
influence of diminishing returns as the firm´s size increases as well as the 
importance of correctly allocating factors to where they generate the most 
value. Additionally, larger firms may face the difficulty of rising supply prices, 
which benefits small independent firms (Coase, 1937, p. 23). The efficiency of a 
firm is another variable to take into account when studying the firm and its size. 
It is highly probable that as the dimension of the firm escalates, the efficiency 
with which it organizes its transactions diminishes.  
In addition to the previous disadvantages of larger firms, there are higher 
costs of organizing and the losses derived from misallocation of resources will 
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 increase as the transactions are carried out from a distance, when said 
transactions vary greatly and when there is a probability that relevant prices will 
change. When contemplating the distance, it is important to note that 
inventions, technological advancements and all kinds of improvements will 
lessen the disadvantages of a growth and aid in the continued growth of the 
firm (Coase, 1937, p. 25). 
Lastly, it should be noted that the growth of a firm might occur in two 
directions, which are not mutually exclusive -- lateral growth or vertical growth. 
Lateral integration, also denominated “combination”, consists of one 
entrepreneur organizing transactions previously coordinated by two or more 
entrepreneurs. Contrarily, vertical integration consists of the firm absorbing the 
organization of a transaction that was previously organized in the market. 
Having reasoned why firms emerge and the factors that influence their size, 
Coase criticizes previously accepted theories as to why firms exist. These ideas 
are that firms emerge due to the complexity caused by the elevated 
differentiation resulting from the division of labor and that the presence of 
uncertainty necessitates the existence of a firm. 
Coase refutes the first argument, which is supported by Maurice Dobb, that 
firms emerge due to the division of labor under the premise that the price 
mechanism acts as the “integrating force” that prevents the chaos caused by 
increased differentiation.  Also, specialization does not always lead to “chaos” 
and, therefore, Dobb´s argument is unacceptable.  
In a very summarized statement, Knight claims that without the presence of 
uncertainty in a system there is entrepreneur who is in charge of coordinating 
production but in a routine manner, which lacks true responsibility, and that the 
introduction of uncertainty, the main concern of the entrepreneur is “deciding 
what to do and how to do it” (1937, p. 27). Coase disparages this first part of 
Professor Knight´s theory questioning the presence of entrepreneurs without 
responsibilities in a system without uncertainty – Who is paying them and for 
what reason? Why is the price mechanism superseded by the figure of a 
coordinator? All of these questions being valid queries as to the existence of 
these coordinators if their presence is superfluous. Coase further criticizes 
Professor Knight´s argument that due to the uncertainty of human nature, it 
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 would be unusual for one man to be able to assure another individual of a 
guaranteed result without the direction of the latter. In other words, if a 
consultant2 enters a contract with an entrepreneur, it would be highly unusual 
for the consultant to be able to assure the entrepreneur of a guaranteed result if 
he is not under the entrepreneur´s direction.  It is an unreasonable supposition 
that a person of superior judgment, who is contracted because of this 
advantage, should be under the direction of an individual who lacks these 
qualities. Typically, consultants are allowed independence in order to fulfill their 
tasks and obtain the desired results. 
In reference to the theories behind the size of firms, Coase invalidates the 
assumption that a firm´s growth is limited, under perfect competition, if its cost 
curve slopes upwards or, under imperfect competition, it will not pay to produce 
more than the output at which marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue by 
pointing out that the assumption is based on the idea that firms only produce 
one product, however, a firm is capable of producing several problems. Taking 
this last detail into account, the previous “cost-curve theory of the firm” is 
deemed impractical (1937, p. 28).  
Concluding his essay, Coase verifies whether or not the concept of the firm 
depicted throughout the article corresponds with the reality of the firm. The 
concept does, in fact, match the essence of the legal concept of firm, which is 
the “employer-employee” relationship. In this latter model, the employee´s (also 
denominated agent) freedom to carry out his employment is a distinguishing 
characteristic.    
 Previous to Coase´s contribution to the study of organizational economics, 
classical and neo-classical theory dictated that an economy could be 
coordinated by the price mechanism and together with the definition of the 
conditions necessary for this type of structure, these observations would be 
known as the theory of the firm.  While the aforementioned theory explained the 
structure and operations of markets it lacked the ability to explain the existence 
of firms. Coase´s great insight into this query is that firms exist due to the fact 
                                                
2 Professor Knight points out that individuals with superior judgment or superior knowledge 
exist and that they are able to obtain an income by marketing these qualities as business 
consultants. This income or reward would be obtained by making contracts with the people in 
charge of production.  
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 that sometimes the cost of managing economic exchanges within the 
boundaries of the firm are inferior to the cost of managing these same 
transactions across markets. Hence, transaction costs were placed at the 
center of the study in the pursuit to expound the existence of firms and the idea 
that markets and firms were alternative forms of coordinating economic activity 
(Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 116).  
 
1.3 Williamson and the Development of the Transaction 
Cost Theory 
 
Despite contributing an innovative perspective of organizational economics, 
Coase´s “The Nature of the Firm” lacked influence until decades later, when 
Oliver E. Williamson continued the development of the economics of transaction 
costs. The main deficiency behind Coase´s ponderings is his failure to 
operationalize his approach as well as the lack of precision in delineating which 
transactions will be left to the market and which are internalized by the firm 
(Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 116). When referring to the failure of 
operationalizing his approach, it should be mentioned that according to Coase´s 
approach governance form matters only to the extent that transaction costs 
prevent individuals from reaching and enforcing mutually beneficial bargains 
and the nature or size of these costs differ between organizational forms. “In a 
world of zero transaction costs, individuals would always negotiate to realize all 
potential gains from trade or cooperation regardless of organizational forms” 
(Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 116).  
The influence of Coase´s discernment grew once Williamson, in addition to 
other economists, operationalized the concept of transaction cost. According to 
Williamson´s reasoning, in order to operationalize Coase´s approach “it is 
necessary to identify the critical features distinguishing governance alternatives, 
assess the differential capacities and limitations of those alternatives in relation 
to attributes of transactions and match governance structures and transactions 
“in a discriminating way” thereby allowing predictions relating transaction 
attributes and organizational form to be formulated and tested” (Masten, 2010). 
Due to his extensive study of transaction costs and correction of its deficiencies, 
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 Williamson´s works are now considered to be the basis of transaction cost 
economics. 
A fundamental contention of Williamson´s Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) is 
that markets and hierarchies are alternative governance mechanisms for 
completing a set of transactions. The former of these alternatives tends to rely 
on prices, competition and contracts to keep all parties of an exchange 
informed of their rights and responsibilities where as the latter governance 
alternative relies on the presence of an authoritive third party known as “the 
boss”. “The boss” has the right to resolve any conflicts that might emerge; 
Williamson terms this right as managerial fiat (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 117).   
 
1.3.1 Behavioral Assumptions  
 
In accordance with his intention of correcting previous theory flaws, 
Williamson departs from the traditional assumptions of established in the 
foundations of neoclassical economics: omniscient hyperrationality and costless 
contract enforcement. Williamson submits a “more self-conscious attention to 
`human nature as we know it´” (1981a, p. 553). The TCT substitutes the 
previous postulations about economic actors involved in exchanges with the 
concepts of bounded rationality and opportunism. “As a consequence of these 
two assumptions, the human agents that populate the firms and markets with 
which I am concerned differ from “economic man” (or at least the common 
caricature thereof) in that they are less competent in calculation and less 
trustworthy and reliable in action” (Williamson, 1981b, p. 1545).3 
Omniscient hyperrationality implies the absence of cognitive limits. Under 
such conditions, all exchanges could be conducted through planning. 
Individuals could devise contracts of unlimited complexity that would specify all 
possible eventualities in an economic exchange. Omniscient third parties 
capable of ideally planning and directing economic activity or of resolving 
disagreements between agents accurately and cheaply do not exist since all 
individuals suffer bounded rationality.  
                                                
3 This departure from “economic man” introduces, what Williamson terms as “organization 
man” (1981a, p. 553).  
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 Bounded rationality refers the fact that, although individuals intend to act in 
a rational manner, their ability to carry out those intentions are hindered by their 
limited knowledge, foresight and computational ability. These limitations make 
individuals unable to solve complex problems instantaneously, anticipate all 
future contingencies or reliably plan and communicate appropriate responses to 
the eventualities they do foresee. Limited competence does not, however, imply 
irrationality since they remain “intendedly rational” (Williamson, 1981a, p. 553).  
The substitution of omniscient hyperrationality with bounded rationality, the 
first of Williamson´s behavioral assumptions, annuls the possibility of complex 
contracting due to the uncertainty factor. As a consequence, the best that can 
be achieved is incomplete contracting (1981a, p. 554). 
The second of Williamson´s behavioral assumptions is opportunism. This 
assumption substituted the postulation of costless contract enforcement and 
that economic actors behave out of self-interest. Williamson´s TCT implies that 
“opportunism effectively extends the usual assumption of self-interest seeking 
to make allowance for self-interest seeking with guile” (1981b, p. 1545). 
Opportunism includes lying, stealing, and cheating but, in a general sense, 
encompasses the incomplete or distorted release of information, especially with 
the objective of misleading, distorting, and confusing partners in the exchange. 
It should be noted that the TCT does not state that opportunism is always 
observed in economic actors, it merely contemplates the possibility of its 
presence. Because of this, the threat of opportunism and the necessity to 
identify opportunistic actors becomes a cost to be assumed in the transaction. 
Without the threat of opportunism, exchanges could easily be carried out on 
the basis of a promise; there would be no reason to distrust the participants in 
the exchange. Since this is not a realistic approach and there are many 
individuals prone to opportunism, safeguards to prevent opportunistic actions 
must be designed to protect individuals and firms. Thus, the previously 
referenced incomplete contracting is the best type of contract that can be 
achieved when there is opportunistic behavior. The cost of distinguishing 
opportunistic agents from non-opportunistic agents ex ante is very costly 
(Williamson, 1981a, p. 554). 
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 Although these behavioral stipulations complicate the study of economic 
comportment and may be unneeded for some purposes, the study of alternative 
modes of organization does not qualify as an exception (Williamson, 1981b, p. 
1545-46). With these behavioral stipulations defined, the TCT dictates that the 
choice of governance depends on the form of governance (market or hierarchy) 
that reduces any potential problems created by bounded rationality and by the 
threat of opportunism. Williamson focuses on the need “to assess alternative 
governance structures in terms of their capacities to economize on bounded 
rationality while simultaneously safeguarding transactions against opportunism” 
which merely shifts, not eliminates, the attention from the emphasis on profit 
maximization (1981b, p. 1546).  
Market forms of governance tend to be less costly than hierarchal 
governance because of lower fixed costs. Therefore, so long as the market 
alternative enables all parties of an exchange to reduce potential problems 
caused by bounded rationality and opportunistic actions, market governance 
will be preferred to hierarchal governance. In the case that the market is unable 
to resolve these problems, a hierarchal governance form will be adopted 
despite being a more costly option (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 117).  To 
synthesize this reasoning, if the main objective is to minimize cost then market 
governance will be chosen. However, if the main concern is to minimize the 
effects of bounded rationality and opportunism, then a hierarchal form of 
governance where a third party resolves problems that arise due to behavioral 
factors is selected. 
 
1.3.2 Transaction Attributes 
 
As stated above, bounded rationality and opportunism are at the core of 
problems for the economic actors participating in the transactions. Attributes of 
transactions that are of particular interest to the economics of organization and 
are critical to their description are the degree to which transaction requires 
transaction-specific investments (also known as asset specificity), uncertainty, 
and transaction frequency. The analysis of the uncertainty and asset specificity 
dimensions is based on the assumption of recurrent transactions (high 
frequency).   
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 A. Asset Specificity 
The most important dimension for describing transaction, and the 
previously most neglected attribute in prior organizational theory studies, is 
asset specificity and the level of specific transaction investment (Williamson, 
1981a, p. 555). Oftentimes, in order to carry out a transaction, parties will need 
to make investments to be able to complete the exchange. The level of 
specificity greatly influences opportunistic actions on behalf of the actors since 
a transaction specific investment usually points towards a quasi-bilateral 
exchange relation between buyer and seller for a considerable period thereafter 
(1981b, p. 1546). For example, if a machine is purchased exclusively to carry 
out an activity and cannot be used to carry out other transactions, it is a highly 
specific investment for the supplier and can lead to the other party taking 
advantage of this. The other party can demand a better price knowing that if 
they back out of the deal then the supplier has no use for that machine. On the 
other hand, if the supplier were to buy a machine that has multiple uses and 
can be of value to various transactions, the risk of opportunistic behavior would 
be minimized.4 
Despite the possibility of opportunistic behavior, both parties are 
significantly “locked into” the transaction. The supplier has made a highly 
specific investment in order to serve the client, which implies a high level of 
commitment on his behalf. Meanwhile, the buyer cannot turn to alternative 
suppliers, assuming that they have not made the same specific investment, 
since the cost of supply from an unspecialized source is great (1981a, p. 555). 
An investment that is very specific suggests that the investment does not 
have value for other transactions and can provoke nonmarketability problems in 
the case of costly specific investments, which are known as idiosyncratic 
transactions. These are transactions of high specificity possessing important 
cost-bearing consequences. Idiosyncratic exchanges include specialized 
physical capital as well as human capital investments that are transaction 
specific. In recurrent idiosyncratic transactions, additional transaction-specific 
savings in communication stemming from familiarity may accrue, as contracts 
                                                
4 This example does not rule out possible opportunistic behavior of the supplier. A 
supplier´s opportunistic behavior can be minimized in situations where the buyer can turn to 
alternative sources to obtain the desired good or service. 
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 are adapted to the unfolding events and are periodically renewed. As the 
contract renewals take place, a specialized language permitting a more efficient 
communication between supplier and buyer develops. Additionally, the 
transaction becomes more personal due to a strengthened trust between the 
agents, which consequently reduces opportunistic behavior. Given these 
concepts, assuming all other factors pertaining to the relationship are equal, 
idiosyncratic transaction relations featuring personal trust will survive greater 
stress and be more adaptable (Williamson, 1979, p. 240-241). 
Asset specificity can present itself in several forms: site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity and dedicated assets (Williamson, 
1983, p. 526).  
 
• Site specificity: occurs when an agent locates their facilities next to 
the other in order to economize on transportation cost. For example, 
building the distribution facility next to the production plant. 
• Physical asset specificity: involves investments in equipment, such 
as machinery, specially designed to serve a particular customer.  
• Human asset specificity: arises when at least one of the agents 
develops valuable skills or knowledge specific to that transaction or 
relationship. 
• Dedicated assets: are investments made to support exchange with a 
particular customer that, though not specific to that customer, would 
result in considerable excess capacity were the customer to 
discontinue the relationship. 
 
The greater the level of transaction specific investments in an exchange, 
the greater the threat of opportunism and, thus, the more likely it would be to 
choose a hierarchal form of governance. Based on these ponderings, 
Williamson answers Coase´s original query of “why do firms exist?”. His 
response is that firms (referred to as “hierarchy” by Williamson) exist in order to 
resolve that problems of market governance with transaction specific 
investments under the conditions of uncertainty. Transaction specific 
investments and uncertainty add a level of complexity that market governance 
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 cannot manage effectively. Once these complex transactions are managed 
under common directives, the management and resolution of the problems is 
facilitated by several factors: more effective communication, common 
processes and a lack of disputes due to the convergence of expectations of the 
parties acting in the transaction.   
Even though hierarchal governance is beneficial in certain scenarios, like 
everything it has its limits and disadvantages. Firms are faced with incentive 
and bureaucratic deficiencies that limit their size; markets are able to offer high-
powered incentives, which are very difficult to replicate in hierarchies, especially 
those larger in size (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 119). 
B. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a major problem related to bounded rationality. “Without 
uncertainty, bounded rationality is irrelevant” (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 117). 
It would not be realistic for parties of an economic transaction to be able to 
foresee how the transaction will evolve over time as well the rights and 
responsibilities that change and be able to manage said transaction. A contract 
that foresees the future and contemplates every possible outcome is 
unimaginable in the face of uncertainty. A high level of uncertainty, particularly 
in the case of a high level of asset specificity, usually implies a greater difficulty 
to use market governances such as contracts. Hence, it would be more likely, 
and convenient, to apply a hierarchal form of governance where it is agreed that 
a third party will mediate and resolve problems as they arise.  
In the case of transactions with high uncertainty and a medium level of non-
specificity, there are two options: standardize the product by sacrificing design 
qualities thus enabling the application of market governance or preserving the 
design and devising a more elaborate arbitration apparatus (bilateral 
governance). Bilateral governance would eventually shift towards integration of 
the activity as uncertainty increases for recurrent transactions (Williamson, 
1979, p. 254). 
A transaction´s grade of uncertainty evolves as the industry matures. The 
greater an industry´s maturity, the lesser a transaction´s uncertainty and the 
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 less it will be integrated within the firm. Thus, the transactions will rely on 
market governance.   
C. Transaction frequency 
Frequency refers to the recurrence of the transaction and can be separated 
into three categories – one-time, occasional and recurrent. The frequency of a 
transaction is often linked with asset specificity or investments given that a 
transaction´s frequency would greatly influence the outcome of an investment 
decision (Williamson, 1979, p. 246). Figure 1 illustrates examples of commercial 
transactions according to buyer frequency and characteristics of a supplier´s 
investment. Figure 1 disregards one-time transactions as very few transactions 
possess this isolated characteristic. The six examples of transaction types are 
shown in the matrix – purchasing standard equipment, purchasing standard 
material, purchasing customized equipment, purchasing customized equipment, 
constructing a plant and site-specific transfer of intermediate product across 
successive stages. Each transaction type should be matched with the 
corresponding type of governance structure.  
According to Figure 2 regarding matching governance structures with 
commercial transactions, the decision to integrate an activity within the 
boundaries of the firm occurs when the transaction is recurrent and 
idiosyncratic (unified governance, also termed internal organization). Only non-
specific investments would de satisfactorily realized through market; all other 
transactions would be carried out according to a hierarchy structure or a hybrid 
form of governance.  All other transaction types would correspond with a hybrid 
form that permits transaction cost economizing.  
Each governance structure possesses its own advantages and 
disadvantages, but certain structures are better suited to transactions boasting 
of particular characteristics or attributes. The following subsection will detail the 
characteristics of the governance structures indicated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 1: Examples of commercial transactions according the frequency and 
degree of idiosyncrasy 5 
 
Figure 2: Matching Governance Structures with Commercial Transactions6 
 
1.3.3 Governance Structures and Fundamental Transformation 
 
In his 1979 article, Williamson classifies governance structures according to 
the investment specificity. The nonspecific governance structure refers to the 
market; contrarily, highly specific structures are carefully adapted to a particular 
transaction and are strongly influenced by identity, as is mentioned in the 
subsection regarding asset specificity. Semi-specific governance structures are 
alternative structures possessing qualities of market governance and 
                                                
5 Source: Williamson, O.E. (1979), “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations”, Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 247 
6 Source: Williamson, O.E. (1979), “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations”, Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 22 No. 2, p. 253 
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 specialized structure. He also suggests several propositions: 
 
• Highly standardized (nonspecific) transactions do not tend to require 
specialized governance structure. 
• Only recurrent transactions will support a highly specialized governance 
structure. 
• Occasional specific transactions will not support a transaction-specific 
governance structure, but require special attention regardless 
 
With these propositions in mind, Williamson links transaction types with 
governance structures, categorizing the governance structures according to 
contract classification7; this relationship is illustrated in Figure 3. The details of 
each governance structure will be expounded according to ascending degree of 
transaction specificity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship between contract classification and governance structure 
 
 
                                                
7 Williamson adopts Ian Macneil´s three-way classification, which recognizes classical, 
neoclassical and relational contracting. For a brief contracting background refer to Williamson´s 
article “Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations” (1979). 
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 A. Market Governance 
Most nonspecific transactions, regardless of their frequency8, have a 
market structure as their main governance structure since the standardized 
characteristic of the transaction should be easily coordinated. This governance 
structure is particularly effective in recurrent transactions, as previous 
experience will dictate whether to continue the relationship or turn elsewhere at 
minimal expense. Occasional nonspecific transactions, however, do not allow 
buyers to rely on direct experience but rather permits the usage of others´ 
previous experience to influence the decision of continuing the partnership. In 
these cases, experience acts as a safeguard against opportunistic behavior. 
This type of exchange would better correspond to the term sale and not to 
a contract. A contract would be employed in this governance structure in the 
absence of a standardized market. Additionally, given the lack of specificity, 
identity is irrelevant. There is no concern as to the sustenance of the 
relationship as there would be in more personal partnerships. Should there be 
any conflict between the parties, they would proceed towards litigation in order 
to settle the claims. 
B. Trilateral Governance 
Trilateral governance is applied in the cases of occasional transactions of 
mixed and high specificity. The principals of these transactions have strong 
incentives for completing their end of the deal once they enter into a contract 
due to the strong investments they have made in equipment, for example, in 
order to be able to satisfy the need of a particular client. The motivation to 
sustain the relationship is higher for idiosyncratic transactions.  
The non-standardized characteristic of specific transactions makes market 
governance unsatisfactory, while the elevated cost of a transaction-specific 
governance structure is too costly. Hence, an intermediate form is needed, 
prompting the adoption of trilateral governance. This governance structure 
would turn to arbitration to resolve disputes and evaluate performance, in lieu of 
litigation and prior experience.  
                                                
8 As clarified in the subsection referring to a transaction´s frequency, one-time transactions 
are disregarded since the isolated characteristic of those exchanges are uncommon in typical 
transactions. 
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 C. Transaction-specific Governance 
Transaction-specific governance is applied in the cases of recurrent 
transactions of mixed and high specificity. As in trilateral governance, due to the 
specificity of the transaction, market governance is hazardous. Unlike trilateral 
governance, the frequency of the transaction makes the cost of a specialized 
governance structure recoverable.  
Two types of transaction-specific governance structures are distinguished: 
bilateral governance and unified governance. Bilateral governance maintains 
the parties´ autonomy whereas unified governance removes the transaction 
from the market, internalizing said activity thus submitting it to the firm´s 
complete control. Unified governance is also known as vertical integration, 
which is one of the most studied applications of the TCT. 
Bilateral governance is applied in recurrent transactions that possess a 
mixed degree of specificity. It is necessary to adopt unified governance when 
the transaction is idiosyncratic due to the investment in human and physical 
assets.  
Due to the mixed specificity present in bilateral governance, components 
that are needed may be obtained from an outside source. In comparison with 
vertical integration, external procurement is beneficial to controlling costs, but is 
much less adaptable than vertical integration because of the dependence on an 
external agent that cannot be controlled. Adaptations to future eventualities are 
made through contract amendments as the eventualities take place; 
contemplating all eventualities is costly and impossible under the condition of 
bounded rationality. Additionally, opportunism is a hazard of adaptation that 
should be recognized and may be curbed by restricting adjustments to those 
that present the least threat of such behavior.  
In reference to adaptations in bilateral governance structures, quantity 
adjustments seem to be a more effective solution than price adjustments. The 
parties involved are more likely to trust quantity adjustments than price 
adjustments since the latter raises suspicions that the other party is attempting 
to alter the terms within the bilateral monopoly arrangement in his favor. Price 
adjustments may be made in certain cases, but only when hazardous effects 
are minimal. 
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 The parties involved in a transaction that applies bilateral governance will 
tend to sustain the partnership. The buyer will not attempt to find an alternate 
supplier since other sources will incur in higher setup costs and the 
idiosyncratic product is not as adaptable to other need or clients as a 
standardized product. Also, suppliers will not try to withhold the product supply 
because a better opportunity has arisen and a larger profit may be obtained.   
The more idiosyncratic a transaction, the lesser the incentives for trading 
and the more it tends to be internalized as to take advantage of possible 
economies of scale. This would correspond with unified governance, which is 
present in vertical integration. A unified governance structure is very flexible as 
the organization of the activity is carried out within the firm and any changes 
can be made without consulting, completing or revising interfirm agreements. 
Highly idiosyncratic transactions, which are vertically integrated, are 
characterized by an extensive adaptability in both price and quantity. 
  
1.3.4 Fundamental Transformation 
 
Opportunistic tendencies where one of the agents may negotiate prices or 
walk away from a deal are irrelevant in situations where the identity of the agent 
is unimportant. As indicated in the subsection pertaining to asset specificity, in 
transactions with high specificity the recurrence becomes a key factor. Without 
the continuity of the relationship, the investing agent is forced to maintain a 
costly investment that may not have alternative uses. Once the identity of the 
agent is recognized and trust is built, opportunistic behaviors would be reduced. 
The notion of high physical or human capital specificity and the importance of 
exchange continuity are linked with the concept of fundamental transformation. 
Given the relationship specific assets, there may be a shift from operating in a 
competitive market (where the level of specificity is low) to a more monopolistic 
setting. Thus the way the transaction is considered varies, prompting a change 
in the governance structure in order to adapt (Williamson, 1979, 239-241). This 
process of adaptation of the governance structure to the characteristics of 
transaction given the dynamic nature of economic relationships is referred to as 
fundamental transformation. 
Safeguards in the form of long term contracting become a necessity to 
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 eradicate the hesitancy of making such specific investments and the fear of 
appropriation. The long-term contracting is limited by bounded rationality and 
possible opportunistic behavior due to the factor of high uncertainty stemming 
from the expanded timeline. The resolve these impediments it would be crucial 
that the contract be devised anticipating a great deal of eventualities as well as 
outlining their resolution or determining a process of adaptation as the 
relationship evolves. This type of contracting is costly, very difficult and 
provokes opportunistic behavior, thus supporting the application for a different 
governance form.  
 
1.3.5 Applications and Limitations  
 
Even with its weaknesses, the TCT does an admirable job of rationalizing 
the existence of firms. The TCT has improved the understanding of governance 
choice and organizational theory; as such, it has numerous applications. The 
most direct application of the TCT is the topic of vertical integration. 
Vertical integration, besides being the most direct application of the TCT, is 
also the most researched application. Coase referred to vertical integration 
within the framework of firm dimension and the value added from the absorbed 
transaction. The TCT approaches it from the perspective of “make or buy” 
decisions and reasons that transaction specific investment increases the 
likelihood that a transaction is internalized within the firm. This outcome is 
supported by a reiteration of the decision to internalize a transaction regardless 
of the type of transaction specific investment – capital intensity, human asset 
specificity or firm specific skills, site specificity, or small numbers bargaining.  
Unlike transaction specific investments, the effect of uncertainty on the decision 
to internalize an activity is erratic (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 120). 
Additionally, Williamson furthers the study of forward integration by commenting 
on the influence of quality of a branded good or service on the decision to 
integrate an activity. In cases of differentiation where the quality of a product 
(and therefore the control of assuring that level of quality) is a major concern 
and a distributor´s level of compliance with standards cannot be verified, it may 
be in the brands´ interest to integrate this activity so that the product´s 
reputation is not maligned by subpar craftsmanship (1981b, p. 1549).   
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 A second application of the TCT, which is of equal importance despite not 
being as researched, is in the field of organizational design. This extension of 
the TCT pertains to the internal organization of the firm and is manifested in the 
multidivisional form as well as the multinational enterprise.  
Williamson asserts that bounded rationality and opportunism are the source 
of the implementation of the multidivisional form in large American firms 
(Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 120).9 These firms are faced with bounded 
rationality due to basic human limitations as well as the difficulty of keeping 
track of the details of every transaction carried out (both internally and 
externally). The complexity of a functional form of organization makes it difficult 
to assign responsibility for successes and failures of a product or line of 
business.  Also the threat of opportunism lurks over growing firms due to the 
diverging goals of the functional units and the firm as a whole. These problems 
are resolved by switching to a multidivisional form. Adopting a TCT perspective, 
the multidivisional form presents several advantages: it has access to more 
accurate information about divisions, it can modify incentives and replace 
inefficient managers more easily, and it can control the strategies implemented 
by the divisions. These arguments may be true in the times they were 
formulated yet in current times they are thought to have lost their significance 
due to the growing role of external investors. 
In reference to the TCT and multinational enterprises, the multinational 
enterprise focus merely questions the existence of multinational in place of 
questioning the existence of the firm. The internalization school repeats the 
reasoning of the TCT in application to multinational enterprises: the more 
complex and uncertain the nature of a transaction involving heterogeneous 
products and a small number of participants (buyers and suppliers), the more 
likely it is that it will be internalized.   
Other contributions of the TCT to organizational design include hybrid forms 
of organization and other alternate forms of organization. Hybrid forms of 
organization refer to intermediate forms of governance that are neither markets 
nor hierarchies and include long-term contracts, joint ventures and franchises. 
Originally, they were thought to be unstable by Williamson. With time he grew to 
                                                
9 This is based upon Alfred Chandler’s historical study of strategy and structure in large 
American firms, which detailed a surge in M-form organization within these institutions. 
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 acknowledge that they occur as often as markets and hierarchies. It can be 
reasoned that hybrid forms of organization exist because of the benefits they 
present. They give us the best of both worlds: stronger incentives and adaptive 
capabilities than hierarchies and more administrative control than markets 
(Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 122).  
In addition to the previous applications, which focused exclusively on the 
uses of the TCT in a mere economic and traditional business capacity, the TCT 
has also been used in other fields. For example, it has been used to arrange 
the internal organization of Congress and public administration as well as 
address the role of trust in economic exchanges, the financing of firms, and the 
functions of corporate governance.  
The Transaction Cost Theory has attracted supporters as well as critics. 
There are three main criticisms directed at the TCT: its focus on cost 
minimization, its understatement of the cost of organizing and its disregard of 
the role of social relationships in economic transactions (Barney & Hesterly, 
1996, p. 123).  
The first of these criticisms is of Williamson´s argument that “economy is 
the best strategy”. The emphasis on cost minimization is viewed as erroneous 
and the contradictory resource-based theory suggests, “creating and exploiting 
transaction specific investments under conditions of uncertainty is essential if 
firms are to gain long-term success” (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 123). 
Additionally, this theory argues that minimizing transaction costs is of little 
benefit if a firm has no transaction specific assets that are highly valued by the 
market and, therefore, avoiding opportunism and minimizing governance costs 
are of lesser importance (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 123). 
The TCT´s second criticism refers to its tendency to understate the costs of 
organizing transaction within the boundaries of the firm. The TCT maintains that 
the presence of a third party (the boss) resolves disputes, including those 
internal to the firm, more efficiently than market governance. Realistically, this 
does not always occur due to the possibility of opportunistic behavior on behalf 
of the authority figure as well as the possibility of lengthy and costly internal 
bargaining.  
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 Neglect of the role of social and cultural forces in economic activity is the 
third main criticism of the TCT. American sociologist Mark Granovetter, who has 
studied economic sociology, points out that networks of social relationships are 
embedded with transactions. Expectations formed by the history of the 
relationship influence these transactions. Two friends may trade specialized 
assets without formal agreements or governance arrangements because they 
share a relationship characterized by mutual trust. Contrarily, distrusting the 
person with whom you are contemplating carrying out a transaction surely 
influences your final decision of carrying out the transaction or not. Despite 
originally overlooking this factor, current scholars are exploring the significance 
of social forces in the TCT (Barney & Hesterly, 1996, p. 123). 
 
1.4 Conclusions  
 
The transaction cost theory is an interdisciplinary theory that merges 
economics with organization theory. Coase´s original query as to the boundary 
of the firm was furthered by Common´s recommendation to center economic 
theories upon transaction and governance (or organization). These ideas, along 
with many others, flourished into what Williamson developed into transaction 
cost economics.   
 Approaching governance structure from an economic perspective based 
on transaction costs should imply the implementation of a governance structure 
that molds itself to the transaction´s characteristics, ensuring that the 
exchanges is realized as effectively as possible. The dynamic nature of 
exchange relationships indicates the need for governance structures that evolve 
in order to adapt to the transaction´s variations over time. With this in mind, the 
decision to make or buy seems relatively complicated and is not as black and 
white as the theory may lead one to believe.  
 
 
 
Marisa Castro Rivas 
31 
Transaction Cost Economics and the Organization of Economic Activity 
 2. Practical Application of the 
Transaction Cost Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A theory is defined as a plausible principle or body of principles offered to 
explain a phenomenon. Its validity should be examined by adopting a practical 
approach and by testing its ability to explain said phenomenon in the real world. 
The transaction cost theory attempts to explain the phenomena of economic 
organization – the decision to make or buy. With this in mind, the objective of 
the following portion of the dissertation is to analyze the transaction cost 
theory´s capability to rationalize the decisions of the companies studied in the 
following cases and challenge the limitations of the TCT. 
The methodology used to execute the study varies from case to case. The 
case study of the glass making company consists of a direct interview with the 
firm´s proprietor to acquire information about the company, it´s activity and the 
thought process behind the decision to internalize the activity of beveling the 
glass. Contrarily, the information for the case study on onefinestay hails from 
the company´s website and travel publications since they do not share 
corporate details with the public given that they are a recent company with a 
different business model than their competitors. Following a description of the 
company and its activity, there is an account of the transaction that was 
internalized, a justification of said decision according to the attributes and 
characteristics detailed in the TCT, and a conclusion of whether or not the 
decision to internalize the activity was sound. 
Prior to proceeding with the case studies, a brief summary of the TCT is 
presented. A firm is presented with certain costs when carrying out a 
transaction. These costs are made up of direct costs associated with production 
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 and transaction costs. The latter has two aspects to consider: strategic and 
economic. The TCT focuses on the economic aspect of transaction costs. 
According to the TCT, an activity will be internalized when, under the 
assumption that the production costs are equal, the transaction costs of 
organizing the activity within the firm is less expensive than the market 
alternative.  
 
2.2 Case Study: López Glassworks 
 
2.2.1 Company Background & Description of the Case 
 
López Glassworks (Cristalería López) is a small glassworks company 
established in 1990 and located in Feáns, La Coruña. The company does 
various types of works with glass – window and door repairs, mirrors, reinforced 
doors, and commercial work, among other activities.  
Beveling, which involves reducing a straight edge to a sloped edge, is a 
feature often demanded by clients. This activity requires highly specialized 
machinery, which would imply a significant investment on behalf of the 
company. In La Coruña and its surroundings, there were only four local 
glassworks companies who possessed the beveling machinery in the 1990s – 
El Reflejo, El Bisel, Unión Cristalera and Cristalería La Luz. Originally, López 
Glassworks subcontracted this activity to El Reflejo. In other words, López 
Glassworks applied market governance to coordinate this transaction.  
By contracting this service to El Reflejo, López Glassworks depended on 
them to execute the task in a timely manner so as to ensure the delivery date 
promised to the client was met. López Glassworks was faced with the problem 
that El Reflejo had its own orders to fulfill and additional beveling jobs to 
complete. Oftentimes, López Glassworks´ orders were delayed so that the 
glassworks company could complete the orders of more important clients. Also, 
another problem that elevated costs was the lack of warranties. Should any 
pieces of López Glassworks break while at El Reflejo, El Reflejo would not 
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 substitute the piece or cover the cost of replacing the piece; López Glassworks 
was responsible for bringing a replacement. 
Given the delays and dissatisfaction with the glasswork´s company, López 
Glassworks decided to internalize the beveling activity in 2005. Additional cost 
analysis indicated that investing in the machinery necessary to carry out the 
transaction proved to be a sound decision since the cost of coordinating this 
activity with the other company was elevated (high transaction costs) – 
checking machinery availability, transporting10 and dropping off the pieces of 
glass that need to be beveled, picking up those pieces upon completion, calling 
to check on the order status and to coordinate logistics, verifying that due dates 
are met, etc. Information asymmetry did not present a major problem since the 
two companies carry out very similar tasks, work within the same sector and are 
located in the same geographic area.  Does the TCT support López 
Glassworks´ decision to invest in the beveling machine and internalize this 
activity? 
 
2.2.2 Analysis 
 
The TCT indicates that an activity will be internalized when, under the 
assumption that the production costs are equal, the transaction costs of 
organizing the activity within the firm is less expensive than the market 
alternative. The assumption that production costs are equal is slightly 
demanding in realistic situations. Typically, production costs are lower in the 
market than within the firm, yet even in this situation, there is a possibility that 
the transaction costs of coordinating the activity in the market are significantly 
higher than coordinating the same activity within the firm. In those cases, the 
total cost of coordinating the activity within the firm is lower than realizing the 
exchange in the market, which would indicate that the activity should be 
internalized to economize in total cost.   
Typically, an activity is integrated within the boundaries of the firm when it 
presents a high level of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency. In spite of 
this, sometimes although the transaction costs of realizing the transaction within 
                                                
10 Logistics costs, such as transporting the pieces, dropping them off and picking them up 
are not considered transaction costs, but could be classified as production costs, which would 
affect the total cost of the exchange. 
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 the firm are lower than coordinating it through the market, the company may 
decide not to follow the TCT´s logic because of financial reasons or because it 
may not be profitable in the long term. With this in mind, the previously 
mentioned transactional attributes will be analyzed in reference to the beveling 
activity. 
Asset Specificity 
 Asset specificity applies to investments that have a single function and its 
usage is limited due to some kind of restriction. The greater an asset´s 
specificity, the lower its potential alternative uses or resale value.  In this case, 
two types of asset specificity can be identified: physical asset specificity and 
site specificity. 
Beveling glass requires a beveling machine, which has no alternate uses. 
Thus, the activity presents a high level of physical asset specificity. Site 
specificity arises from the need for a workshop area to store the machinery and 
carry out the activity. 
The background information about the López Glassworks indicates that 
during the 1990s only four local companies possessed a beveling machine, 
which could be identified as a scenario of small numbers (reduced agents). 
Theoretically, in situations of small numbers opportunism may not be avoided, 
as is the case of situations with large number exchangers. Opportunistic 
behavior may be better controlled by adopting a hierarchy governance structure 
since internal organizations have the ability to monitor behavior easily, unify 
interests and can mediate differences more easily than the market.  
Opportunism tends to occur when there is information impactedness (when 
one party has a greater understanding or information about a transaction than 
the other party). The problem of information impactedness tends to be a greater 
problem in small number transactions due to the lack of information 
transparency. The diagram illustrated in Figure 4 represents the relationship 
between opportunism (human factor or behavioral assumption) and small 
numbers (environmental factors) that influences the governance structure 
chosen.  
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Figure 4: Combination of human and environmental factors that cause the 
existence of extraordinary transaction costs in the market11  
 
Uncertainty 
The concept of uncertainty arises due to the existence opportunistic 
behavior and bounded rationality in cases of highly specific assets. The greater 
the uncertainty, the more background information will be sought prior to 
establishing the transaction and the greater the contract´s complexity in order to 
anticipate future eventualities. Both of these actions would elevate the 
transaction costs associated with the exchange. Also, an elevated level of asset 
specificity implies a greater level of uncertainty within a transaction.  
López Glassworks is faced with considerable uncertainty of whether or not 
the other glassworks company will meet the deadlines or whether they will 
place López Glassworks´ pieces to the side to fulfill the orders of more 
important clients, which matches the concept of uncertainty presented in 
organizational theory. The phone calls López Glassworks had to make to check 
up on order statuses as well as to coordinate deliveries of new orders and pick-
ups, however, are considered transaction costs. These phone calls were 
becoming rather costly and the coordination was becoming complicated; 
internalizing the activity would save López Glassworks the time and cost of 
obtaining that information. This could be related with the atmosphere 
relationship depicted in Figure 4. Atmosphere refers to the notion that 
interaction effects, such as the unreliability of El Reflejo to complete the jobs on 
time and the irritation of having to constantly call in to check up on orders, could 
                                                
11Adapted from: Williamson, O.E. (1983), Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications: A study in the economics of internal organization. New York: The Free Press.  
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 influence the transaction and ultimately change the organization of that activity. 
The complexity of coordinating the activity ultimately factored into López 
Glassworks´ decision to integrate the beveling activity.  
Frequency 
The greater the frequency of a transaction, the more it tends to be 
internalized. Glass beveling is considered a recurrent transaction given the 
demand for this feature, especially taking into account the construction boom 
during those years. Recurrent idiosyncratic transactions tend to be internalized 
within the firm, which corresponds with Lopez Glassworks´ situation of having a 
strong and steady weekly demand. 
Final Remarks 
According to the transactions characteristics – high specificity, high 
uncertainty and recurrence – the decision to integrate the activity within the firm 
is backed by the TCT. López Glassworks seems to be basing its decision on an 
economic component, which is covered in the TCT. The coordination costs 
stemming from market governance are considerably higher than its alternative, 
proving that in a situation of recurrent idiosyncratic transactions market 
governance is ineffective. Unified governance allows transaction cost 
economizing with the added benefit of being a very adaptable structure since 
changes can be made and applied almost instantaneously.  
 
2.3 Case Study: onefinestay 
 
2.3.1 Company Background & Description of the Case 
 
Onefinestay is a start up company based in the United Kingdom who has 
capitalized on the trend of travelers seeking alternative options to hotels and 
whose main activity is renting luxury vacation homes. Founded in 2009, the 
company currently offers the possibility of renting luxury vacation homes in 
London and New York City and is hoping to expand its services to other major 
cities around the world. Onefinestay flourished from the notion of the unhotel; 
this concept allows renters to live like a local in their chosen home, but with the 
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 added benefit of having hotel-like amenities. These services include maid 
service, fresh linens, upscale toiletry products and concierge service. 
Bloomberg BusinessWeek has coined it “the rich man´s Airbnb12” (Suddath, C., 
2012) and it is a spot on observation. 
The company works in two phases. First, the owners of homes are 
subjected to a membership process and, once they are approved, the home is 
offered to prospective travellers though the website.  
 
The membership process consists of the following stages: 
 
• The owner proposes listing the home and fills out a questionnaire about 
the home (address, neighborhood, number of rooms, features, 
availability of the home, etc.). 
• The home is scheduled for a photo session to envision how photogenic it 
is and whether or not it would appeal to clients. 
• An interview is scheduled with the owner of the property, to make sure 
that the interests between onefinestay and the owner are aligned. 
 
Once the property has been approved and listed, the bookings are the 
exclusive responsibility of onefinestay and are made through the company´s 
website. The owner merely needs to indicate on the calendar application the 
days the home will be available. There is complete anonymity between the 
owner and renter. The properties are listed on the website and the client can 
refine the search according to availability, location or the number of rooms 
desired. Each booking includes the following services: Wi-Fi, a personal 
welcome, 24-hour client support, an iPhone to use during the stay, hotel-grade 
cleaning, toiletries, towels and upscale linens. 
The home services team manages cleaning, maid service and linen 
supplies. When a home is booked, a member of the home services team or an 
                                                
12 Airbnb is a San Francisco-based company founded in 2008 that offers a portal to 
vacation rentals, but these locations are not exclusively luxury homes as in onefinestay. They 
are present in 192 countries. Airbnb merely acts as a site for homeowners to post available 
lodging options and for renters to find a unique space within their price point. Cleaning services 
and other amenities are subject to the owner´s responsibility; he is not required to provide 
additional services.  
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 operational employee will go through the apartment with the owner prior to the 
guests arrival and make note of any rooms that must be sealed off or valuable 
pieces that the owner would like stored during the guest´s stay. The home 
services team will then clean the home, switch the owner´s linens and toiletries 
for those provided by onefinestay, and finalize any other preparatory details. 
The maid service also cleans the apartment once the guest has vacated the 
home and prepares it for the owner´s return.  
The in-house home service differs drastically from Airbnb´s policy in which 
the owner is solely responsible for the apartment´s upkeep and cleaning. The 
decision of onefinestay to internalize the housekeeping services is the topic of 
analysis in the following subsection. Does the TCT support onefinestay´s 
decision to internalize the housekeeping services?  
 
2.3.2 Analysis  
 
Asset Specificity  
The activities encompassed within the home services division appear to 
lack any type of asset specificity. Cleaning a home, changing the linens and 
ensuring the availability of high-end toiletries are activities that could be carried 
out easily by the market. The only possibility of asset specificity lies in the 
physical asset specificity as the cleaners might need professional cleaning 
appliances (such as vacuums or steamers) to carry out their tasks at a hotel-
grade level, but presently these can easily be acquired by anyone at a specialty 
store, which would nullify any potential specificity claims.    
 
Uncertainty  
In this case, it was determined that there is no asset specificity, which 
would permit the conclusion that there is no uncertainty. Additionally, it should 
be noted that if the housekeeping services were contracted to a professional 
cleaner or cleaning company, it is very easy to verify that they have completed 
their end of the deal. With a cursory review of the home, onefinestay can tell 
whether or not the home was properly cleaned or not. This would support the 
conclusion of a lack of uncertainty in this transaction.  
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 Frequency 
 
The greater the frequency of a transaction, the more it tends to be 
internalized. This is the only attribute that backs onefinestay´s decision to 
internalize the home services activities. Cleaning and the home preparation 
activities are very frequent due to onefinestay´s business: luxury vacation 
rentals. Homes are rented constantly and there is a continual need to clean the 
homes and prepare them for either the renter´s arrival or their owner´s return. 
Final Remarks 
According to the previously studied attributes, the home services activities 
would not be internalized according to the TCT since the activity is not highly 
specific and there is a lack of uncertainty. Focusing on the economic aspect of 
transaction costs, the TCT would theoretically support a market or hybrid 
alternative of organization. However, this would highlight a limitation of the TCT: 
a disregard of the strategic motivator for internalizing certain activities.   
Occasionally, strategy and economic motives are aligned towards the 
decision to assume activities within the firm, but in this case it can be deduced 
from the transactional attributes that the reason for internalizing the home 
services is strategic. The firm targets a niche market of upscale vacation 
rentals, thus pursuing a differentiation strategy. It would need to guarantee the 
utmost standard of quality not only in the homes selected, but also their 
maintenance and upkeep. An in-house cleaning team would ensure that the 
high standards are maintained since the company employees would fulfill the 
tasks more thoroughly than an external cleaner given that, as an employee, 
they share the same interests as the firm.  
The delegation of tasks, such as cleaning and home preparation, to a 
specialized company would introduce the problem of residual loss. The 
divergence of interest between onefinestay and the cleaning company would 
suggest the need of monitoring the latter, which increases transaction costs for 
onefinestay. Accordingly, the economic aspect of the TCT pertaining to 
transaction costs may be considered as a factor in onefinestay´s decision to 
internalize home services. Since onefinestay failed to share whether or not the 
cost of hiring a cleaner or cleaning company influenced the decision to assume 
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 the home services activities, there is no certain information supporting this 
argument. Therefore, it may be concluded that strategy is the driving force 
behind onefinestay´s decision to internalize home services.  
Despite possessing a sound reasoning and the capability of explaining 
many other organizational phenomena, the TCT is faced with a limitation in this 
situation. Oftentimes, although certain activities may be less expensive to 
organize through the market, the cost of correcting errors may be greater than 
those resulting from internalizing the activity. If onefinestay decided to 
externalize the home services activities and the cleaning company carried out 
it´s task poorly, inadequate monitoring of the process by onefinestay to correct 
this error could result in a very unhappy homeowner or client. Furthermore, the 
client may abandon them and onefinestay´s luxury reputation could be 
jeopardized. It this sense it is less costly for the company to internalize the 
activity than repair a damaged reputation or recuperate unsatisfied clients.       
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
The previous case studies allow for a unique view of the TCT and its 
application in realistic situations many firms face. These cases allow a more 
complete understanding of Williamson´s transaction attributes and 
organizational attributes and their influence on the coordination of exchanges. 
In spite of this, these cases also highlighted that although the TCT has the 
ability to explain the decision to internalize and predicts which governance 
structure best adapts to the transaction´s characteristics; the theory´s prompts 
do not necessarily coincide with the firm´s decision in real life.  
The TCT does not recognize that financial and strategic factors influence 
the firm´s ultimate governance structure. In the first case, transactional 
attributes would suggest the López Glassworks should integrate the activity 
within the firm yet due to financial restrictions that are common to young 
companies, the activity was outsourced in the first moment although finally it 
was integrated. Similarly, the onefinestay case study brought to light a 
considerable limitation of the TCT – disregarding strategic factors that influence 
a firm´s decision.  
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 These case studies focus on vertical integration, which is assimilated as a 
hierarchy governance structure, and its main alternative market governance. 
Both of these are extreme forms of organizations; the companies did not 
consider alternative hybrid forms.  
For example, López Glassworks only considered two options – internalize 
the activity or outsource the activity to another company. A hybrid form 
consisting of a strategic alliance with another or multiple local glassworks 
company/companies could have been another option. Granted, one would need 
to calculate the transaction costs that could arise from the coordination of such 
a governance structure, but this is another option. A hybrid form that may have 
been a valid option for onefinestay is long-term contracting. This alternative is 
closer to the market governance end of the governance structure spectrum, but 
given the strategic necessity of ensuring quality standards comparable to a 
luxury hotel the direct internalization of the home services activities was a 
sensible decision. The environment´s dynamic nature may prove that, in the 
future, shifts in the transaction´s attributes may lead them towards changing 
these governance structures in order to economize on transaction costs. 
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Final conclusions 
 
 
It is undeniable that the transaction cost theory is extremely valuable in the 
quest to comprehend the organization of economic activities. As Williamson 
suggests, the transaction cost approach most likely has a greater relevance for 
studying commercial enterprises since natural selection forces operate with 
greater force in those types of enterprises, but this does not diminish the 
importance of transaction cost economizing to all forms of organization (1981a, 
p. 573). Generally, governance structures that are more efficient at transaction 
cost economizing will substitute inadequate forms of organization except in 
cases where the trade-offs prove that such an adaptation is not worth it 
(Williamson, 1981a, p. 574).  
“While it is injudicious to claim too much for the transaction cost approach, 
neither do I want to claim too little” (Williamson, 1981a, p. 574). Like all 
theories, the transaction cost theory has its limitations and is not capable of 
explaining all organizational phenomena, but it is able to explain a great deal of 
matters. Its main application of studying vertical integration is rather 
enlightening given the effect that an expansion of a company´s range of 
activities could cause on said enterprise´s future. It is critical that companies 
properly assess the characteristics of a transaction prior to internalizing the 
activity since integrating activities that are of no use to improving the company´s 
competitiveness could be detrimental to its future.   
The purpose of this dissertation was to better understand the logic behind a 
company´s decision to internalize an activity, thus broadening its limits. A 
review of the Transaction Cost Theory and its antecedents were necessary to 
accomplish this objective. Although this theory may have had limited origins, 
Williamson´s ability to operationalize the theoretical foundations facilitated a 
further development of these notions and proves that the future may hold 
advancements to the theory that may reduce its boundaries, broadening its 
scope of application.   
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 Finally, transaction cost economics’ merging of various fields of study – law, 
economics and organization – reminds social scientists that all fields are 
connected. To properly comprehend problems in one of these fields, the 
ramifications of the other fields on that problem must be considered in order to 
properly diagnose the underlying causes of the problem and present an 
effective solution. This make transaction costs framework a very useful and 
versatile theory, however, more research is needed to strengthen it.  In the 
words of Williamson:  
“The economics of organizations has been and is an exciting 
research arena. Participating in this has been satisfying to me 
and others and I think that the new generation of scholars can 
recognize that their predecessors have made headway. But there 
are also limitations and big challenges ahead. So let´s push the 
boundaries. (N.A., 2007, pp. 384-85).” 
 
 
   
 
 
Marisa Castro Rivas 
44 
Transaction Cost Economics and the Organization of Economic Activity 
 References 
(2007). An Interview with Oliver Williamson. Journal of Institutional Economics, 
3, pp 373-386 doi:10.1017/S1744137407000768 
Airbnb (n.d.). About us. Retrieved from < https://www.airbnb.com/about> 
Barney, J. & Hesterly, W. (1996). Chapter 1.4 organizational economics: 
Understanding the relationship between organizations and economic 
analysis. In Clegg, S., Hardy, C. & Nord, W.R. (Ed.), Handbook of 
organization studies (pp. 115-123). London: SAGE.  
Bellafante, G. (2012, July). New Frontier for Tourists: Your Home. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/nyregion/your-
home-the-new-frontier-for-tourists-in-new-york-city.html> 
Carroll, D. (2011, October). Home Sweet Home. The Australian. Retrieved from 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/home-sweet-home/story-
e6frg8h6-1226163332316> 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, Volume 4 (Nº 16), 386-405.  
Masten, Scott E. "Williamson, Oliver. E (born 1932)." The New Palgrave Dictionary 
of Economics. Online Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. 
Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 19 March 2013 
<http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2010_W000141> 
doi:10.1057/9780230226203.3842 
 
 
Marisa Castro Rivas 
45 
Transaction Cost Economics and the Organization of Economic Activity 
 Onefinestay (n.d.) The unhotel. Retrieved from <http://www.onefinestay.com/the-
unhotel/> 
Onefinestay (n.d.) Become a Host. Retrieved from 
<http://www.onefinestay.com/hosts/> 
Robbins, T. (2011, September). Make Yourself at Home. Financial Times. Retrieved 
from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/851db740-e07a-11e0-bd01-00144feabdc0. 
html#axzz1Z8t93BvR> 
Strauss, K. (2012, October). Disrupting the Hotel Biz: Enter the Un-Hotel, Forbes. 
Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2012/10/15/ 
disrupting-the-hotel-biz-enter-the-un-hotel/> 
Suddath, C. (2012, August) OneFineStay: The Rich Man´s Airbnb. 
BloombergBusinessweek. Retrieved from <http://www.businessweek.com/ 
articles/2012-08-28/one-fine-stay-the-rich-mans-airbnb> 
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-cost economics: The governance of 
contractual relations. Journal of Law Economics, 22(2), 233-261.  
Williamson, O. E. (1981a). The economics of organization: The transaction cost 
approach. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 87(No. 3), 548-577.  
Williamson, O. E. (1981b). The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, attributes. 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 19, 1537-1568.  
 
 
Marisa Castro Rivas 
46 
Transaction Cost Economics and the Organization of Economic Activity 
 Williamson, O.E. (1983), Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications: A study in the economics of internal organization. New York: 
The Free Press 
Williamson, O. E. (1998). Transaction cost economics: How it works; where it is 
headed. Economist, 146(1), 23-58.  
Williamson, O. E. (2002). The theory of the firm as governance structure: From 
choice to contract. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3), 171-195.  
Williamson, O. E. (2010). Transaction cost economics: The natural progression. 
American Economic Review, 100(3), 673-690. doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.673  
 
